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“An Explosive of Quite Unimaginable Force”:  
Did Werner Heisenberg Obstruct German Atomic Bomb Research? 
 
 In late February 1942, the German nuclear physicist Werner Heisenberg declared to a 
group of Nazi party officials that the splitting of uranium atoms could produce “an explosive of 
quite unimaginable force.” Heisenberg’s ten-minute lecture, entitled “The Theoretical 
Foundations for Energy Acquisition from Uranium Fission,” was one of seven non-technical 
lectures at a conference held to inform Nazi military research and industrial decision-makers on 
the application of atomic physics to weapons and energy production. This short program of 
lectures featuring many of Germany’s most prominent nuclear physicists was organized by 
Bernhard Rust of the Reich Research Council shortly after he assumed control of Germany’s 
nuclear research program early in 1942. After his memorable description of an atomic bomb, 
Heisenberg went on to note that obtaining sufficient fissionable material for such a bomb would 
be “very difficult.” This combination of an alluring description for his Nazi listeners and a 
qualifier to dampen their enthusiasm captures the ambiguity that is so often seen in Heisenberg’s 
actions regarding nuclear research during World War II. Heisenberg’s wartime conduct is 
therefore subject to multiple interpretations by historians attempting to discern his true stance on 
the provision of an atomic bomb to Nazi Germany.
i
 
 Heisenberg and his fellow German nuclear physicists cannot ultimately be held 
responsible for the failure of Nazi Germany to produce an atomic bomb. There are larger 
political and military explanations for why Hitler never had an atomic bomb at his disposal. 
Germany’s early war strategy of “lightning” war depended on the rapid occupation of enemy 
territory. Until late 1941, the brisk pace of the war created a prevailing view in Germany that it 
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would soon end in a victory for Hitler. The anticipated lengthy research process required to 
develop an atomic bomb made it a low funding priority early in the war.
ii
 
 After more than two years of a successful lightning war, the German army faced its first 
major obstacles in the forms of the Russian army and winter in December 1941. This caused the 
Nazi government to begin an evaluative process of reassessing its military priorities and how the 
Germany economy could best be made to support them. As for military weapons development, 
priority went to arms that could be developed sooner rather than later. Typical of this approach 
was Hitler’s 1942 decree that no weapons projects were to be funded that could not have arms 
ready for field use within six weeks of their start date. Physicists engaged in nuclear research did 
not ultimately receive the substantial funding that would have been necessary to make a serious 
attempt at building an atomic bomb before the war’s end. A major subject of this paper will be 
the interpretation of Heisenberg’s apparent attempts to gain Nazi support for nuclear research 
during this transitional stage in the war.
iii
  
 Werner Heisenberg was arguably the most prominent physicist in German nuclear 
research during the war. His early wartime research at Leipzig focused on the theory of chain 
reactions in uranium. In April 1942, Heisenberg was appointed to the position of director at the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, from which nuclear research throughout the nation was 
directed. His significance as a Nobel prize winner and an important member of the pre-war 
international physics community, his friendships with many physicists who eventually worked 
on the Allies’ Manhattan Project, and his postwar explanations of his nuclear research in Nazi 
Germany have all made Heisenberg a popular subject for historians.
iv
 
 Heisenberg was never a member of the Nazi party. Even his critics would concede that he 
never supported Nazi political and social ideals. For example, Mark Walker considers him an 
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apolitical scientist who did not sufficiently consider the ethical aspects of his research. The 
subject of the debate is whether Heisenberg conscientiously worked to produce an atomic bomb 
for the Nazis. Heisenberg variously claimed that he either never had a choice to make or not 
make the bomb, or that his and his colleagues’ moral scruples in opposition to it resulted in the 
failure of the Nazis to produce a bomb.
v
  
 As Heisenberg saw it, he had three possible responses to the outbreak of war in 1939. 
First, he could emigrate to the United States. In fact, Heisenberg seriously considered a teaching 
position at Columbia University in 1938. However, in the end, he was too devoted to the well-
being of Germany, particularly modern German science.
vi
 Second, he could actively oppose the 
Nazi regime. Third, he could “pretend to collaborate.” Heisenberg considered the latter two 
options in a letter to Robert Jungk. 
Under a dictatorship active resistance can only be practiced by those who pretend to 
collaborate with the regime. Anyone speaking out openly against the system thereby 
indubitably deprives himself of any chance of active resistance. For if he only utters his 
criticism from time to time in a politically harmless way, his political influence can easily 
be blocked… If, on the other hand, he really tries to start a political movement, among 
his students for instance, he will naturally finish up a few days later in a concentration 
camp. Even if he is put to death his martyrdom will in practice never be known, since it 
will be forbidden to mention his name… I have always… been very much ashamed when 
I think of the people, some of them friends of my own, who sacrificed their lives on July 
20 and thereby put up a really serious resistance to the regime. But even their example 




According to Heisenberg’s postwar recollections, he chose to pretend or fake his collaboration 
with the Nazis. If this is an accurate characterization of his decision, then his choice had major 
consequences for the historical interpretation of his actions, as will be shown below. 
 To pretend collaboration with the Nazis was a dangerous game to play. He had to act in 
such a way that not only Nazi officials would believe, but also any of his physicist colleagues 
who supported the Nazis, that he supported their causes. What deeply cherished personal values 
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would have caused Heisenberg to make this sacrifice? Preservation of the modern scientific 
enterprise in Germany was a preeminent value of Heisenberg’s. 
 Heisenberg had good reasons for believing that war and Nazi ideology could threaten the 
progress of modern German science. In 1936 and 1937, Heisenberg was personally attacked by 
Philipp Lenard, a leader of a German nationalistic science movement known as deutsche Physik, 
as a “white Jew.” His scientific accomplishments were an “aberration of the Jewish mind.” 
Proponents of deutsche Physik responded to the numerous discoveries by Jewish physicists, 
Albert Einstein and his theory of relativity being the most notable, during the early 20
th
 century. 
They argued that the discoveries of ethnic German physicists were superior or had greater truth-
value than their Jewish counterparts. Their opponents, including Heisenberg, responded that 
scientific propositions could not be evaluated on the basis of the ethnicities of their progenitors. 
Despite Heisenberg’s reputation as the leading theoretical physicist in 1930s Germany, deutsche 
Physik had sufficient political strength to block Heisenberg’s succession to the teaching post of 
his mentor Arnold Sommerfeld at the University of Munich upon the retirement of the latter. 
Heisenberg naturally perceived deutsche Physik as a major threat to the practice of modern 
physics in Germany so long as the Nazis were in power.
viii
 
  Heisenberg aimed to “put the war in the service of science” by pursuing nuclear research 
for Germany.
ix
 Nuclear research held out the hope for Nazis of an atomic bomb and massive 
energy production. But at that time nuclear research was also a scientific pursuit on the cutting 
edge of physics. One basic way to help German science during the war was to keep the scientists 
from being killed or injured during military service. Heisenberg sought exemptions from military 
service for several hundred young scientists that he needed for nuclear research after becoming 




 Heisenberg’s stance versus the Nazis and his desire to preserve German science through 
wartime nuclear research unfortunately generated conflicting claims. Could he conduct nuclear 
research for the Nazis without building an atomic bomb for them to use? Heisenberg thought that 
the circumstances of bomb research were favorable to his reconciliation of the two conflicting 
ends. Heisenberg recalled after the war that he discussed this complex issue with his close friend 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker. Heisenberg told his friend, “If the technical exploitation of 
atomic energy is still a very, very long way off, then it can do no harm to work in what you call 
the ‘uranium club.’” At the time, he argued that the technical barriers to the creation of an atomic 
bomb were so great that the weapon could not be built before the war’s end. Participating in the 
Nazi-led nuclear research effort also meant that he could ensure that the bomb would stay under 
the control of physicists, the assumption being that physicists were on a higher ethical plane than 
the Nazis. “Again, if atomic technology is, so to speak, knocking at the gate, then it is far better 
to have some influence over developments than leave it all to others or to pure chance.”
xi
 
 In Heisenberg’s autobiography Physics and Beyond, he recalled a conversation he had 
with von Weizsacker early in the war about how to do nuclear research without giving Hitler an 
atomic bomb. They discussed the strategic limitation of nuclear research to subject areas that 
could not produce a bomb. “I believe that we can work with a clear conscience—even in our 
relations with the officials—on chain reactions in this type of [natural] uranium pile and can 
leave the business of getting uranium 235 to others.” It is ironic that Heisenberg’s Leipzig 
research team eventually specialized not only in chain reaction theory but also isotope 
separation. It seems naïve in retrospect to believe first that such a strategic approach could be 
consistently adhered to by the entire group of German nuclear physicists—a necessity if a bomb 
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would be prevented—and, second, that such a scheme could be kept secret from Nazi 
authorities.
xii
   
 The strategy for developing atomic bomb technology but keeping it out of Nazi hands 
entailed several levels of risk for Heisenberg. Nuclear research in the 1930s and 1940s was a 
field with intensely self-driven scientists who were always eager for the recognition that came 
with major discoveries. The satisfaction provided by such discoveries of having acquired new 
knowledge of reality should not be discounted. This ambitious nature could easily blunt the 
ethical sensibilities of many scientists. But it was not exclusive to German scientists. Richard 
Rhodes captures this milieu of scientific ambition well when relating Edward Teller and Hans 
Bethe’s early conceptualization of the hydrogen bomb for the Allies. “It was new, important and 
spectacular and they were men with a compulsion to know.” Was Heisenberg’s assessment 
correct that his group of German physicists were of a sufficiently uniform approach to keep an 
atomic bomb out of Nazi hands? The German science publisher Paul Rosbaud answered in the 
negative. Observing a group of nuclear physicists who expressed relief in knowing in mid-1942 
that the Nazis had finally abandoned the hope of building a bomb in time for the war, he 




 Heisenberg was far from immune to the same weakness as his fellow physicists. Two 
people who knew him well, his wife Elisabeth and his friend von Weizsacker, applied the 
German word “ehrgeiz”, usually translated as “greed for honor,” to Heisenberg. Von Weizsacker 
described him as “competitive, fair, [with] uncontrollable ambition for achievement.” When 
Heisenberg’s wife used ehrgeiz to describe him, she hastened to qualify this by adding that his 
ambition for achievement was more prominent than his desire for recognition. Heisenberg’s most 
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frequent justification for engaging in nuclear research during the war was that due to Germany’s 
wartime economy and military strategy, an atomic bomb could never have been produced before 
the war’s end. But given the universal ambition in the German physics community, this was 
certainly a risky supposition. While confined by the British at Farm Hall in 1945, Heisenberg, 
Otto Hahn, and other leading German nuclear physicists became aware for the first time of the 
Allies’ atomic bomb after the Hiroshima bombing. Hahn responded to the news with a taunt: “If 
the Americans have a uranium bomb then you’re all second-raters. Poor old Heisenberg.”
xiv
 
  Following the war, Heisenberg typically denied that he had any significant impact on 
whether a German atomic bomb was built or not.  He was never compelled to make a decision on 
making a bomb or not simply because Germany was not prepared in terms of either its military 
strategy or industrial capacity for the sustained effort necessary to create a bomb. In a 
conversation with his wife in 1942, he reportedly observed, “We are lucky that things are as they 
are, and that these facts spare us from having to make a real decision. It is being made for us, and 
for this we are grateful.” Heisenberg implied at other times that he more actively resisted the 
production of a bomb. Jungk describes Heisenberg as being much more actively involved in 
preventing the production of a bomb by, for example, attempting to create an international 
alliance of scientists against atomic bomb production and by pursuing the directorship of the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics. Heisenberg read proofs of Brighter Than A Thousand Suns 
and corresponded with Jungk afterward, but never attempted to correct Jungk’s portrayal of an 
active conspiracy against the bomb as untrue.
xv
 
 Historians have not always been charitable in their judgment of Heisenberg’s 
participation in Germany’s nuclear research program. Arnold Kramish argues that Heisenberg 
was acting in the role of a Nazi spy gathering intelligence on Allies’ nuclear research during his 
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September 1941 visit with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen, despite relying only on circumstantial 
evidence that von Weizsacker was interested in the progress of Allied research around that time. 
Any voluntary interaction by Heisenberg with the Nazis is often interpreted by historians to be 
collaborative and is held against him.
xvi
  
One can gather from Heisenberg’s own post-war writings outlined above the standard of 
Nazi resistance that he wished to be measured against. He “pretend[ed] to collaborate” with the 
Nazis in order to achieve two higher goods: a) The preservation of modern German science 
during the war. b) The prevention of an atomic bomb from being built in Nazi Germany.  
 
Heisenberg sought two higher goods through his participation in  
Germany’s wartime nuclear research. 
a) The preservation of modern German science during the war. 
b) The prevention of an atomic bomb from being built in Nazi Germany. 
 
If this is thought to be a reasonable and ethical response to Nazi rule, then there are two 
interpretive assumptions for the historian to adhere to: 1) One can expect to find evidence of a 
mix of pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi actions in Heisenberg’s record. Heisenberg believed that he 
needed to take what he considered inconsequential actions in support of the Nazis in order to 
establish his loyalty and generate credibility for actions that the Nazis thought to be questionable. 
2) One should not expect to find gratuitous pro-Nazi actions in Heisenberg’s record. There 
should not be actions that seem to have no strategic value for the ultimate achievement of the 
higher goods in view. It should, however, be recognized that gratuitous pro-Nazi actions are 
sometimes difficult to definitively identify. 
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Not only did the two higher goods conflict with Nazi ideals, they also at times conflicted 
with each other. Higher good a) conflicted less with Nazi ideals as the war progressed and Nazi 
officials began to see the military benefits of allowing modern scientists to develop new 
weapons. But higher good b) progressively conflicted with higher good a) in proportion to the 
degree that the Nazis increasingly accepted a). In other words, Nazis began to accept the 
legitimacy of modern science as they recognized its possible products, such as the atomic bomb. 
But as Nazis perceived the growing reality of an atomic bomb’s creation, opponents of an atomic 





Interpretive Assumptions: If Heisenberg “pretend[ed] to collaborate” with the Nazis, then 
the historian should expect to find the following features in his wartime research record: 
1) A mix of pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi actions. 
2) A lack of gratuitous pro-Nazi actions with no strategic value. 
 
 Another interpretive point of Heisenberg’s wartime actions concerns the evidence used to 
evaluate them. Sources contemporary to the events in question are clearly beneficial in being 
“closer” to the event itself. However, because of the totalitarian nature of Nazi Germany, 
evidence of anti-Nazi action by Germans is often difficult to come by. The truth behind a given 
document or memory of a conversation may be hidden behind a façade meant to hide it from 
Nazi authorities. Heisenberg noted that “communication became increasingly difficult—only the 
most intimate of friends dared to speak their minds to one another, otherwise, you resorted to the 
kind of language that hid far more than it revealed.” Fortunately, evidence in the form of post-
war testimony or memory of wartime events was provided free of the fear of Nazi 
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recriminations. However, one façade is traded for another as witnesses or actors to wartime 
events are now free to alter the narrative for selfish purposes if they wish. There are at least three 
reasons why Heisenberg in particular would be tempted to selfishly adjust a narrative of wartime 
events he was featured in. First, he may have been ashamed of his actions in the Nazi’s nuclear 
research program; perhaps his ethical judgments of Hitler and the Nazis shifted following the 
war and his postwar beliefs condemned his war actions. Second, his wish to continue 
professionally in nuclear research on energy production following the war may have compelled 
him to minimize his role in wartime atomic bomb research; the Allies occupying West Germany 
certainly did not wish to risk the chance of ex-Nazi physicists developing an atomic bomb. 
Third, Heisenberg may have been too professionally proud to admit that he had failed or even 
appeared to fail at building a bomb.
xviii
 
 The remainder of this paper will be an application of this charitable standard of conduct 
to a selected set of Heisenberg’s major decisions and public acts that occurred during a pivotal 
period for both the German nuclear research program and the larger Nazi war effort, late 
September 1941 to June 1942. The following events in Heisenberg’s wartime experience will be 
examined: 
1) A September 1941 conversation with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen, Denmark. 
2) A February 1942 lecture for Nazi officials on the applications of fission chain 
reactions to military purposes. 
3) A June 1942 lecture for Nazi officials on how an atomic bomb could be built. 
4) Heisenberg’s July 1942 appointment to the directorship at the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute for Physics in Berlin. 
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I will argue that although Heisenberg’s record regarding these events is mixed and not 
susceptible to a definitive conclusion, there are significant indications that he was able to sustain 
modern German physics during the war and that he sought to prevent Hitler from acquiring an 
atomic bomb.  
In September 1941, the astounding success of Hitler’s lightning war tactics was on full 
display as Germany occupied increasingly more of Europe. This was a time when Germans’ self-
confidence in their war effort ran high and Germany seemed unstoppable. By December 1941, 
circumstances for the German army had drastically changed as it met the obstacles of the 
Russian army and a severe winter. From this time, Nazi officials began a period of self-
examination in which they assessed how the resources of the nation were being used to support 
the war effort. The wealth of the nation was brought to bear more closely on the German war 
effort. Walker writes that, “although German authorities and most Germans still expected to win, 
any hope of a quick victory was gone, and it now appeared that the war might drag on for a few 
years.” Heisenberg probably embarked from his train in Copenhagen in September 1941 with the 
expectation of an impending Germany victory.
xix
 
Heisenberg’s Visit With Niels Bohr in Copenhagen, Denmark 
 In September 1941, Heisenberg and von Weizsacker traveled to Copenhagen to lecture at 
an astrophysics conference hosted by the German Cultural Institute. They had arranged the trip 
through the influence of von Weizsacker’s father, a Reich Foreign Office official, for the purpose 
of speaking with the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. German physicist Fritz Houtermans had 
recently discovered that using a nuclear reactor, U-238 could be made to absorb a neutron and 
eventually decay into plutonium, another fissionable material that could be used for an atomic 
bomb. This was thought by Heisenberg to be an easier and faster route to acquiring fissionable 
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bomb material than the separation of uranium isotopes. Houtermans’ discovery caused 
Heisenberg to later reflect that, “It was from September 1941 that we saw an open road ahead of 
us, leading to the atomic bomb.” Now that development of a German atomic bomb had taken a 
major step toward becoming a reality, Heisenberg and von Weizsacker, speaking after the war, 
related how they began discussing the ethical implications of their research at this time. They 




 Despite their longstanding friendship, Bohr was suspicious of his former students’ visit 
for several reasons. Bohr had not seen either of them since before the German occupation of 
Denmark in April 1940, raising his suspicions that the two German physicists had secrets they 
were hiding, possibly about German nuclear research. Heisenberg and von Weizsacker 
demonstrated a lack of empathy for Bohr’s circumstances as a half-Jewish physicist in a German 
occupied country. They callously expressed their disappointment that Bohr boycotted the 
conference at the German Cultural Institute, a disseminator of German propaganda to the 
occupied nation. In a lunch conversation at Bohr’s Institute of Theoretical Physics, Heisenberg 
defended the German invasion of Poland and called war a “biological necessity.”
xxi
 
 Heisenberg’s visit to Copenhagen is well-known and often examined by historians 
looking for insight into his perspective on the German atomic bomb program. Bohr’s and 
Heisenberg’s communication with one another was impaired by their cautious awareness of Nazi 
surveillance. Heisenberg later reflected, “Being aware that Bohr was under the surveillance of 
the German political authorities… and that his assertions about me would probably be reported 
to Germany, I tried to conduct this talk in such a way as to preclude putting my life into 
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Another factor in their poor communication was the effect of a year’s scientific isolation 
and secrecy during a period of such prolific discoveries in nuclear physics. Bohr did not yet 
believe that an atomic bomb could be successfully made. Bohr probably misunderstood 
Heisenberg’s drawing of a reactor due to an independent path of nuclear inquiry that German 
physicists traveled while isolated from international developments. The physicist Hans Bethe 
believed that Bohr and Heisenberg “talked straight past each other” due to their differing 
awareness of recent discoveries.
xxiii
 
 The content of their conversation has been the subject of intense debate by historians. 
Heisenberg without question shocked Bohr with the news that Germany had a research program 
to develop an atomic bomb. Heisenberg expressed his ethical concerns about the research, 
wondering if “one has the moral right to work on the practical exploitation of atomic energy.” 
Bohr missed Heisenberg’s meaning and responded with resignation that physicists could be 
expected to work for their own governments during wartime. According to Heisenberg, Bohr 
was so surprised at the prospect of Hitler acquiring an atomic bomb that he was unable to attend 
to other concerns Heisenberg wished to communicate to him.
xxiv
 
 After telling Bohr of his research in Germany, Heisenberg shared with Bohr his 
assessment that Germany could never surmount the substantial technical and industrial obstacles 
to building an atomic bomb during the war. Heisenberg further intimated that it might be 
“possible for all physicists to agree among themselves that one should not even attempt work on 
atomic bombs.” This was an ironic proposition given Heisenberg’s efforts to advance German 
science despite the war. An international boycott on bomb research would place limits on 
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Heisenberg’s personal and nationalistic ambition. If Heisenberg’s recollection of this proposition 
was accurate, then it would have entailed a significant personal sacrifice. Mark Walker and 
David C. Cassidy express skepticism that Heisenberg ever proposed a boycott on bomb research 
in this conversation. Walker argues that Heisenberg’s post-war recollection was a product of “the 
shock of Hiroshima and the threat of the looming Cold War.” He writes that it is difficult to 
believe that Heisenberg would have sought such a boycott at a time when the German army had 
had such unmitigated success and was expected to win the war. Moreover, why would 
Heisenberg seek a boycott when he did not judge either side to be capable of summoning the 
resources and technical effort to create a bomb before the war’s end anyway? Cassidy adds that 
there is no evidence up to the date of the conversation that Heisenberg was ever concerned about 
the ethical implications of his research. Finally, in an unsent letter addressed to Heisenberg after 
the war, Bohr’s memories of the conversation are clear: Heisenberg told him that the war would 
be decided with atomic weapons, and Bohr did “not sense even the slightest hint that you and 
your friends were making efforts in another direction.”
xxv
 
 While Bohr’s memory was clear, the correct historical interpretation of this conversation 
is less than clear. There is no evidence to suggest Heisenberg’s ethical introspection prior to his 
conversation with Bohr. But is it reasonable for one to expect evidence of this type? To have 
written down or orally communicated such concerns could have made Heisenberg vulnerable to 
Nazi authorities. Furthermore, Heisenberg took a great risk in visiting Bohr and telling him about 
Germany’s secret bomb research. His meeting with the citizen of an occupied country to reveal 
the existence of a secret Nazi program meant that Heisenberg’s life was endangered—not only 
by Nazi surveillance, but also American and British intelligence officers. If Heisenberg’s 
recollections are believed, then his conversation with Bohr supported higher good b) outlined 
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above. Additionally, the historian’s prior anticipation of a mix of pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi 
(interpretive assumption 1) above) is also realized. Heisenberg traveled to Copenhagen on the 
Nazi business of lecturing at the German Cultural Institute, but was actually attempting to build 
an international boycott on bomb research. The mixed evidence for this event prevents the 
historian from arriving at a strong conclusion about Heisenberg’s conscientious work to achieve 
higher good b). One must look elsewhere for more conclusive evidence.
xxvi
  
“The Theoretical Foundations for Energy Acquisition from Uranium Fission” 
 
 Heisenberg delivered a lecture to Nazi officials on the generation of energy from uranium 
fission on February 26, 1942. (This paper began with a brief description of his lecture.) The 
lecture was given at a time when the nuclear research program had recently lost its funding by 
the Army Ordnance Office. The German Physical Society, with which Heisenberg was 
associated, had therefore begun a campaign to lobby the government for increased funding for 
physics research. Cassidy argues that its goal was to “make warfare serve physics by 
demonstrating how physics could serve warfare.” Much of the ten-minute lecture was oriented 
toward a basic, non-technical description of uranium fission and how it could be used in power 
production as opposed to building a bomb. However, Heisenberg made two remarkable points 
that surely caught the officials’ attention. First, he tantalizingly described a bomb based on 
uranium fission as having “quite unimaginable force.” Second, after noting the difficulty of 
separating a sufficient amount of U-235 isotope from natural uranium for the attainment of a 
bomb’s critical mass, he proceeded to describe the much easier process of acquiring the 
fissionable bomb-material of plutonium from decaying U-238. Heisenberg finished the lecture by 
effectively issuing a challenge to his listeners: “The Americans seem to be pursuing this line of 
research with particular urgency.” All of these features of the lecture appear to have been 
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calculated to generate support for nuclear research, including that for an atomic bomb. In fact, 
Heisenberg achieved his apparent objective. Wolfgang Finkelnburg, vice-president of the 
German Physical Society, thanked Heisenberg two months later for his role in the February 




 Not all historians agree with this assessment of his lecture. Thomas Powers argues that 
Heisenberg’s lecture was confusing, vague, and deliberately intended to confuse his science-
illiterate listeners. For example, Powers contends that he intentionally obscured the distinction 
between fast and slow fission. David Irving on the other hand calls the lecture “a masterpiece of 
clear exposition, and even now it is hard to fault.” Indeed it is hard to attribute obscurity to a 
lecture in which Heisenberg explained the concept of fission chain reaction using a simple 
analogy to the increases and decreases in a human population, accompanied by a diagram.
xxviii
 
 A successful defense of Heisenberg’s continued focus on higher good b) depends on two 
anticipatory points he must have kept in mind. First, this lecture must be interpreted as 
Heisenberg demonstrating to Nazi officials that he was loyal to the government and working 
hard to create an atomic bomb. Second, due to the limited wartime resources of Germany and the 
major industrial and technical requirements for an atomic bomb, “we were happily able to give 
the authorities an absolutely honest account of the latest development, and yet feel certain that no 
serious attempt to construct atom bombs would be made in Germany.” Assuming the truth of 
these two points, then Heisenberg played a dangerously high-stakes game. The game was not 
made any safer by his use of the memorable and astonishing description of the bomb as a “quite 
unimaginable force” or by virtually daring the Nazis to beat Allied forces to the creation of an 
atomic bomb. Cassidy contends that Heisenberg was “willing to flirt with the catastrophic 
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consequences of atomic research for the sake of what he believed would be beneficial to himself 
and to German science.” While his persuasive tactics were effective in promoting higher good a), 
they did so at the expense of higher good b) and violated interpretive assumption 2).
xxix
 
A Pineapple-Sized Bomb 
 On June 4, 1942, Heisenberg delivered another lecture to Nazi officials and industrial 
leaders on the topic of how an atomic bomb could be built. It was well-attended by top decision-
makers, including Albert Speer, who Hitler had charged with mobilizing the German economy 
for the support of the military effort. The timing of the lecture was essential for the future 
funding of German nuclear research. The Reich Research Council, which administered the 
nuclear research project, was about to be subjected to the funding priorities of Hermann Goring’s 
Four-Year Plan. Speer’s assessment of Heisenberg’s lecture and those of other physicists 
speaking at the Kaiser Wilhelm Society-hosted conference determined the funding priority level 
that would be assigned to the project. Heisenberg’s topic came as a surprise to many attendees, 
most of whom did not know that a bomb of such immense explosiveness was possible. 
Heisenberg claimed afterward that he intentionally did not mention plutonium as one type of 
bomb material “because we wanted to keep this thing as small as possible.” However, historian 
Paul Lawrence Rose counters that Heisenberg did in fact propose the use of plutonium during the 
lecture and afterwards as well. During the discussion period, Heisenberg used yet another 
memorable and stirring phrase to describe the bomb to his audience. He was asked, “How big 
must a bomb be in order to reduce a large city like London to ruins?” Powers explains that 
Heisenberg “cupped his hands in midair around an imaginary bomb core, and said, ‘About as big 
as a pineapple.’” Irving notes that this description caused “uneasy excitement” among the 
attendees. Rose argues that Heisenberg’s pineapple-sized bomb must have been a plutonium 
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bomb due to his documented misunderstanding of uranium’s critical mass at that time, which he 
thought to be several tons in weight.
xxx
 
 Speer and Heisenberg had a significant conversation after the conference about the 
funding of nuclear research. During the lecture, Heisenberg had complained about the drafting of 
young physicists into the military and the difficulty of obtaining raw materials for research 
during the war. Speer asked him afterward what else he needed to build an atomic bomb for 
Germany. Heisenberg’s list included greater access to raw materials for research, a cyclotron, an 
underground bunker laboratory, and more young scientists exempted from military service. He 
also asked for a budget increase from 75,000 to 350,000 marks, a sum that Speer still considered 
“ridiculously tiny.” Overall, Speer reflected after the war that Heisenberg’s answer to his funding 
inquiries was “by no means encouraging” as, despite granting all requests, he was still told not to 
“count on anything for three or four years.” He consequently assumed that atomic bomb 
“development was very much at its beginning.”
xxxi
  
 It is unclear why Heisenberg requested so little funding for the German nuclear research 
project at a time when Speer was prepared to grant him much more. He explained after the war 
that he would not have had the “moral courage” to request the industrial employment of 120,000 
people on the project at such a critical moment in the war. Rose suggests that Heisenberg 
believed that the project had not reached the point scientifically at which he would know how to 
employ an industrial force on the scale being used by the Allies’ Manhattan Project. In case of 
failure to produce a bomb before the end of the war, he did not want to be held by the Nazis to 
that standard. His funding requests were simply based on his more immediate objective of 
building a “critical reactor.” Perhaps the best explanation for Heisenberg’s decision was given by 
his wife, Elisabeth: “He did nothing to try and convince the responsible people in the 
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government to seriously attempt to build the bomb. No doubt, if he had wanted to achieve this he 
could have.”
xxxii
   
 The record of Heisenberg’s June 1942 lecture is mixed. His unfortunate description of a 
pineapple-sized bomb capable of destroying the city of London clearly violates interpretive 
assumption 2). Even if true, it was a sensational image that Heisenberg could have excised from 
his exposition, yet still made his point. However, this drawback is outweighed by Heisenberg’s 
decision to ask for very little funding from Speer and by leading him to believe that an atomic 
bomb could not be made before the war’s end. This was a decision that adversely affected higher 
good a), while possibly constituting as big a factor as any in the achievement of higher good b).     
Appointment to Director at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics 
 Heisenberg assumed the position of director at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics 
on July 1, 1942. This Institute was the focal point of nuclear research in Germany from 1942 
onward. The Institute’s director was the highest position a physicist could hold in Germany but 
was also highly politicized. He could not have been appointed without an excellent reputation in 
support of the Nazi regime. Heinrich Himmler played a critical role in the appointment as he 
fulfilled a promise he had made to Heisenberg following the Munich professorship debacle. 
Heisenberg was criticized after the war for, according to his wife, “having assumed such an 
important position in the Nazi regime at such a late date.” Critics understood his acceptance as 
an endorsement of Nazi policy and argued that if Heisenberg had taken a moral stance against 
Hitler, then other German physicists might have been inspired to resist as well.
xxxiii
 
 Heisenberg had at least two good reasons for accepting the position. First, as the 
Institute’s director, he would have control and leadership of the entire German nuclear research 
program. Aside from the prestige, Jungk notes that Heisenberg “feared at that time that other less 
 20 
scrupulous physicists might in different circumstances make the attempt to construct atom bombs 
for Hitler.” This reason, if it is an accurate portrayal of Heisenberg’s motivations, satisfies 
interpretive assumption 1). Accepting the directorship was an excellent example of how 
Heisenberg could take an outwardly pro-Nazi action for the anti-Nazi reason of gaining higher 
good b). Second, Heisenberg’s acceptance of the director position constituted a definitive victory 
over the deutsche Physik movement. In this way, he could ensure the ongoing preservation of 
modern German physicists and the institutions they worked in during the war. This was an 
unusual instance in which he could take a major step toward the achievement both of his higher 




 Despite his leadership of Germany’s nuclear research program during World War II, 
Heisenberg’s actions either for or against the building of an atomic bomb are not a definitive 
factor in explaining why Hitler never acquired an atomic bomb. The isolation of Germany’s 
physicists and the paucity of resources available to them compared to the large host of physicists 
and industrial strength brought to bear on the problem by the Allies help to explain why 
Germany never had an atomic bomb.  Even with the focus and resources of the Allies, they still 
did not have a bomb ready for use until the closing phase of the Pacific war.  
Yet Heisenberg is a fascinating figure for historians to study because he was a Nobel 
prize-winning nuclear physicist who was fully a member of the prewar international scientific 
community, but decided to stay in Germany during the war despite being opposed to Hitler and 
the Nazis. He arguably stayed in Germany and pretended to collaborate with the Nazis in order 
to realize two higher goods: preservation of modern German scientists and scientific institutions, 
and the prevention of an atomic bomb from being built. Heisenberg ran the risk during his 
lectures of promoting atomic bomb possibilities too much—he risked actually getting what he 
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asked for. He heightened the risk with his vivid descriptions of the bomb. But the lectures were 
also highly effective in protecting German physicists and their research—i.e., higher good a).  
The evidence in his record is not unambiguous concerning Heisenberg’s efforts toward 
higher good b). The two lectures analyzed in this paper were counterproductive to his apparent 
effort to prevent a German bomb. But he took two major steps to demonstrate his commitment to 
preventing a bomb’s construction in Germany: his decision to request little funding for nuclear 
research at a time when larger amounts were surely available to him, and his acceptance of the 
directorship at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics. The four events examined in this paper 
are, of course, not the whole story of Heisenberg’s wartime experience regarding nuclear 
research; there is an immense amount of additional evidence that has been exhaustively 
evaluated particularly well by historians such as David C. Cassidy and Thomas Powers. But his 
funding request and Institute directorship were major actions of Heisenberg’s at a critical 
moment in the war for both Germany as a whole and for its nuclear research program. Overall, 
Heisenberg was able to effectively achieve both of his higher goods through his approach of 
“pretend[ing] to collaborate” with the Nazis.     
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